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200 PEOPLE fl. BYRD [42 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5481. In Bank. Feb. 4, 1954.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WALTER THOMAS BYRD, 
Appellant. 
OJ Grand .J1l1T-Pro<;eedings-Jr.eview of Action of Grand .Jury.-
Mere fact that grand jury which indicted defendant had as one 
of its members a juror who was not competent to act because 
he had served as juror within a year and been discharged (see 
Code Civ. Proe., § 199) did not affect validity of indictment, 
especi.uIy where juror was not present when indictment was 
returned, such irregularity not amounting to a jurisdictional 
defect.. 
[2] Homicid&--wtructions-Punishment.-To aid jury in fixing 
punishment in murder case if defendant is first found guilty 
of first degree murder, court may properly inform jury that 
a prisoner sentenced to either death or life imprisonment may 
be pardoned or may have his sentenee redueed by the Governor, 
and that a prisoner serving a life eentence may be paroled but 
not until he has served at least seven yeare. 
[S] Oriminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Argument of Oonnsel.-
A defendant convicted of first degree murder may Dot com-
plain on appeal of district attorney's argument relative to a 
prisoner under life sentence being eligible for parole in seven 
years ano. any imprisonment short of life as Dot being punish-
ment for defendant "because he is accustomed to being in jail" 
and ''when he comes out, who knows what resentment he is 
going to bear and against whom '" where defendant's counsel 
made no objection to such argument nor was court requested 
to admonish jury, the case not being one where any possible 
harmful eftect of such comment could not have been obviated 
by a timely admonition or instruction to jury, or where evi-
dence was so closely balanced that assailed argument might 
have contributed materially to verdict.. 
[4&,4b] Homicid&--Instruct1ons-EillinI by Mea.na of Lyiq in 
Wait.-An instruction in an uxoricide case on the killing by 
means of lying in wait was warranted by evidence that de-
fendant was armed with a .32 Colt pistol during four hours 
that he waited Dear wife's house, and that immediately on 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Grand Jury, § 31; [2,7] Homicide, 
1236; (3) Criminal Law, 11099; [4] Homicide, 5174; [5] Homi-
cide, § 15(5); [6] Homicide, § 174; [8, 12] Criminal Law, 1465; 
Witnesses, § 255: [9] Criminal Law, § 1080(2) ; [10] Criminal Law, 
§820; [11] Criminal Law, 1467(1); [13,14] Criminal Law, § 286; 
[15] Homicide, § 179(5); [16] Homicide, 11179(5), 185; [17] 
Homicide, 1158; [18] Criminal Law, 11446. 
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departure of last visitor defendant entered house and, ao-
cording to his own admission, tired gun at bed in which his 
wifl! was lying, thl! elements of waiting, watching and conceal-
ment being present. 
(6] ld.-Murder in Firat Del1'88-KilliD& by LJ'iDI in Wait.-
If killing is cODWlitted by lying in wait, it is murder of tirst 
legree by force of Pea. Code, 1189, and question of premedita-
tion is not further involved. 
. [8] Id.-Instructions-Intereat in Deceaaed Wife's Estate.-It was 
proper to instrUct jury in an llXoricidecase regarding de-
fendant's interest in his wife's estate as result of her death 
without leaving a will where, according to the evidence, de-
fendant's wife was awarded family home by interlocutory 
divorce decree which had become tlnal at time of trial, but 
where, inasmuch as the parties remained husband and wife 
until entry of final decree, defendant was entitled to share in 
his wife's estate (Prob. Code, § 221) unless he was convicted 
of murdering her (Prob. Code, 1258), these being matters for 
court's judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875.) 
Id.-Instructions-PaDishment.--Court may properly instruot 
jury that, on conviction of ftrat degree murder, it is within 
jury's discretion to impose either death penalty or life im-
prisonment, thatdiscretioD to relieve defendant from extreme 
penalty should be employed only when jury are .satisfled that 
lighter punishment should be imposed, and that if they do Dot 
find extenuating facts or circumstances to lighten punishment 
it is their duty tob penalty at death. 
Criminal Law-Evidence-OonfessioDB: Witnesses-Impeach-
ment.-An involuntary confession may not be used either for 
purpose of proving crime confessed or for purpose of impeach-
ing defendant. 
Id.-Appeal-Objections-Evidence-OonfessioDB.-Defendant 
ma7,not successfully complain on appeal that tape recordings 
of conversations between himself and deputy district attorney 
were admitted in evidence without any foundation being laid 
.. concerning vo1untary character of confessions therein, where 
DO objection was made at time they were dered in evidence, 
and where such objection, if it had been made, could probably 
haT"! been met by the proseC11tion. 
Id.-Instruct10DB - Bvidence - Confessions.-An instruction 
dealing with involuntariness of confession induced by violence, 
~ats, promised immunity or other inducements is properly 
nfused where there is no evidence which could support a 
eonolusion of such improper oonduct. 
See CaLJur. Homioide, 112 et seq.; Am.Jur .. Homicide, 
18. 
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[11] Id.-Evidence-Confessions - Condition of Detendant.-In-
toxication at time of making confessions does not deprive con-
fessions of required spontaneity to make them free and volun-
tary. 
[12] Id. - Evidence - Oonfessions: Witnesses: Impeachment.-
Where confessions in tape recordings were voluntary, various 
aspects thereof can be used for impeachment or as aftlrmative 
evidence of guilt. 
[13]· Id.-TrlaJ.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal. 
-While' practice by prosecution of withholding evidence in 
chief for purpose of using it later for impeachment has been 
condemned, it is recognized that order of proof rests in sound 
discretion of trial court. 
[14] Id.-Trial-Order of Proof-Evidence in Ohief on Rebuttal. 
-In a murder case it was not an abuse of discretion to permit 
district attorney to offer in evidence portions of tape recording 
of defendant's conversations with deputy district attorney 
which were quoted by district attorney to defendant on wit-
ness stand in cross-examination for purposes of impeachment 
and remainder of recording for sole purpose of showing nature 
of defendant's voice, his physical condition as revealed by his 
voice, and his nervous condition or lack thereof, as against 
objection that such evidence should have been presented in 
prosecution's case in chief, where district attorney stated that 
he could not have impeached defendant until after he had 
testified. 
[15] Homicide-Instructions - Deliberation and Premeditation.-
The words "To constitute a deliberate and premeditated kill-
ing, the slayer must weigh and consider the questiQn of killing 
and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in 
mind the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act 
causing death" are not part of any statutory definition, though 
they would constitute a proper portion of an instruction in a 
murder ease. 
[16] Id.-Instruction&-Deliberation and Premeditation: Degrees 
of Otrense.-Instructions given in a murder ease fully and 
fairly advised jury concerning distinction betwea flrst and 
second degree murder and also regarding meaning of delibera-
tion and premeditation, where they gave statutory definition 
of murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and its classification as first de-
gree murder if the killing was "willful. deliberate and pre-
meditated" with malice aforethought (Pen. Code, 1189), de-
fined "deliberate" as meaning formed or arrived at or de-
termined on as result of careful thought and weighing of con-
siderations for and against proposed source of action, stated 
[IS] See O&l.Jar .. Criminal Law, 1805; Am.J'ar .. Trial, 1128 
... 
,/ 
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that law does not require that thought of kUling be pondered 
over any specified length of time in order for killing to be con-
sidered deliberate and premeditated and that true test is not 
duration of time but rather extent of l'efiection, and defined 
second degree murder as killing a human being with malice 
aforethought, but without deliberation aud premeditation and 
not perpetrated by means of lying m wait. 
(17] Id.-Evidence-Deliberation and Jtremeditation.-Direct evi-
dence of a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill is not 
required to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, smce 
deliberation and premeditation may be inferred from proof 
of such faeta and circumstances as will furnish a reasonable 
ground~or such an inference. 
[18] Oriminal Law-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed. 
. -Where evidenee is sufficient to sustain conviction of first 
degree murder, Supreme Court would not be authorized to 
reduce degree of crime (Pen. Code, § 1181, suM. 8) or to re-
duce penalty from death to life imprisonment. (Pen. Code, 
,1260.) 
• APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239 
. ), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura 
eo11lDty and from an order denying a new trial. Waltel' J. 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first 
.... "' .. &" ... murder imposing death penalty, afiirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
DA1nnt:v Attorney General, Roy A. Gustafson, District At-
(Ventura), and James E. Dixon, Deputy District At-
• for Respondent. 
SPENCE. I.-Defendant Walter Thomas Byrd was charged 
indictment with the murder of his wife, Susan. He 
.p,leaQE~Q not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The 
returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree 
.W1·tJlCllut recommendation, and he was found sane. His motion 
a new trial was denied, and the death penalty was 
The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, 
(b).) 
See Oal.J'ur .. Homicide, 114 et seq.; Am.J'ur .. Homicide, 
\ 
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As grounds for reversal, defendant urges these points: 
(1) invalidity of the indictment because of incompetency 
of the grand jury; (2) errors in the charge to the jury, 
both in giving and refusing to give certain instructions; 
and (3) insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. 
There is no merit to any of these objection."" and the judgment 
must be affirmed. 
Defendant, a man 41 ycars of age, was a chronic alcoholic. 
He and his wife had been married about 17 years, and they 
had two children-Gracelee, aged 16, and Connie Sue, aged 6. 
On December 31, 1952, Mrs. Byrd obtaincd an interlocutory 
decree of divorce, in which she was awarded all the com-
munity property. Both prior to and after the divorce decree, 
defendant and his wife had frequent quarrels. Before their 
divorce, Mrs. Byrd had defendant arrested for an assault 
upon her, for which he served a 60-day jail sentence; and 
she also had him committed to the Camarillo State Hospital 
as an alcoholic, where he stayed for 90 days. In the course 
of the divorce action, defendant and his wife had several 
heated arguments relative to a property settlement; and 
during the few weeks following the divorce, particularly 
just preceding Mrs. Byrd's death, they quarreled violently 
over defendant's refusal to sign a qnitclaim deed to certain 
property. 
During December, 1952, and January, 1953, defendant was 
drinking heavilY. Then deciding to "sober up" and taking 
some "nerve tablets," defendant On February 3, 1953, went 
to his wife's home in Santa Susana KnoUs to see his family. 
Mrs. Byrd spoke to him about signing the quitclaim deed 
to the property. At first, after some argument, he agreed 
to sign the deed, but when they went to a notary public for 
that purpose, he again refused to sign. Defendant then 
left his family and went to his sister's home in Van Nuys, 
where he spent the night. While there he drank some rub-
bing alcohol and wine, and took some sleeping pills. The 
next night about 10 p. m. defendant stole two guns and some 
shells from a gunshop in Van Nuys. After walking the rest 
of the night to Santa Susana Knolls, some 25-30 miles, de-
fendant found some friends and he spent the day, February 5, 
drinking with them. While there, he showed one of the men 
his guns, and they practiced firing shots. Then, after dozing 
awhile, defendant started for his wife's home, where he 
arrived between 7 and 7 :30 p. m. A Buick car and his wife's 
ear, a 1947 Chevrolet, were parked in front of the house. 
.. , ~ 
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He sat in a vacant lot for a time, and then got into his wife'. 
car, drank some more wine. and dozed from time to time. 
The owner of the Buick car drove off shortly after defendant'. 
arrival. Almost immediately thereafter a second visitor ar-
rived in a Ford pick.up truck. and he stayed until about 
11 :30 p. m. Mrs. Byrd retired to her bedroom about 9 p. m., 
f. leaving the visitor and' her two daughters watching television. ~ After this visitor left in his Ford pick-up truck. defendant l went into the house. Gracelee testified that she heard foot-
'i' •. ,... steps and her father's voice say "Sue. is that you'" Her 
mother answered "Yes" and then something like "Get out 
of here I" Then she heard a shot and her mother said "Oh, 
Lee" (as the mother called defendant). She then heard 
another shot. Gracelee testified that she did not see her father 
but she recognized his voice. which didn't sound normal but 
had a high pitch, more like he had been drinking. One shot 
went through Mrs. Byrd's head causing her death. and an-
other through her shoulder. Defendant testified that after 
the shooting he walked about a mile. where he found a shack 
and spent the balance of the night The next morning he 
was found by deputies from the sheriff's office and was placed 
under arrest. 
[1] Defendant first challenges the validity of his indict-
ment. The People and defendant stipulated that the 1953 
, grand jury which indicted defendant had as one of its memo 
, bers a juror who had sat on the 1952 grand jury; but it 
, was further stipulated that this juror was not present when 
the indictment was returned against defendant. Section 199 
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ., a person is 
not competent to act as a juror" if he has served as such 
within a year and been discharged. Defendant contends 
that the deviation here from the statutory provision rendered 
.... the entire proceeding void. He relies on Bruner v. Superior 
Court, 92 Cal. 239 [28 P. 341], where the competency of a 
, grand jury was successfully attacked because it was sum-
I moned by an elisor without first showing that the sheriff was 
/ disqualified to perform that duty. Under those circumstances, 
, it was held that the grand jury was a body without semblance 
of authority, and that any indictment returned by it was a 
, nullity and failed to confer jurisdiction upon the superior 
. eourt to try the defendant. Concerning this point it was said 
, in Fitts v. Superior Court. 4 Ca1.2d 514. at page 521 [51 
'.P.2d 66]: U A. reading of the Bruner case indicatea that 
I 
) 
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it was not decided upon any theory of error or' irregularity 
in the proceedings leading to the impanelment of the grand 
jury, but that it was based upon the admitted total absence 
of an essential jurisdictional fact (a finding that the sheriff 
was disqualified) requisite to the organization of a valid 
grand jury through the instrumentality of an elisor .••• 
Mere irregularities, as distinguished from jurisdictional de-
feets, occurring in the formation of a grand jury will not 
justify a court declaring an indictment a nullity. (People 
v. Murphy, 71 Ca1.App. 176, 180 [235 Pac. 51].) The true 
distinction lies between the acts of a body having nO semblance 
of authority to act, and of a body which, though not strictly 
regular in its organization, is, nevertheless, acting under a 
color of authority. (Citing cases.)" \ 
In the Fitts case certain indictments were claimed to be 
void and of no e1fect because found and returned by "an 
invalid and unconstitutionally organized grand jury." (4 Cal. 
2d 517.) It was argued that the grand jury list was not 
prepared in substantial compliance with the statutory provi. 
siODS in that it was not the act of a majority of the judges 
of the· respondent court and the names appended thereto 
were not apportioned among the several wards and townships 
as required by law; that the judges were biased and preju. 
diced as to the type of person who should be selected for 
service and as to the legal requirement that the grand jury 
be selected by lot. In line with its distinction of the Bruner 
case. IUpra, the court in the Fitts case held that accepting 
the claimed errors in the method of impaneling the grand 
jury "at their face value," such irregularities did not amount 
to a jurisdictional defect depriving the respondent court'. 
power to proceed with a trial on the indictments, and that 
the grand jury was at least a de facto grand jury, with its 
acts and proceedings deemed valid and entitled to fun credit. 
(I. re GMmOtI,69 Cal. 541 [11 P. 240}.) Likewise here, 
accepting defendant'. claim of error, such irregularity did 
not dect the validity of the indictment found against defend. 
ant. (See PeopZ6 Y. Hunter, 54 Cal. 65; People Y. Simmon" 
119 Cal. 1 [50 P. 844]; McFarland v. Superior Oourt, 88 
Cal.App.2d 153, 160 [198 P.2d 318).) 
Defendant next challenges the correctness of certain instruc-
tiODS. [2] The jury was instructed: "You may not con· 
sider the matter of punishment in determining whether or 
not the defendant is guilty. or if you find him guilty, in 
determining the crime or degree of crime of which he is 
/ 
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guilty. However, if you find the defendant guilty of murder 
of the first degree, you may then consider the eonsequences 
of the two possible sentences in determining what punish-
ment the defendant should receive. A prisoner sentenced 
to either death or life imprisonment may be pardonea or 
may have his sentence reduced by the Governor. A pnsoner 
,erving a life sentence may be paroled, but not until he has 
,erved at least seven years." (Emphasis add~d.) It is 
contended that this instruction, following certain argument 
by the prosecutor, seriously prejudiced defendant before the 
jury. The district attorney first stated that life imprison-
ment would not be a satisfactory punishment for the erime 
eommitted, although it might be if it meant that defendant 
would actually be imprisoned for life. But he added, "in 
California the law is that a man under a life sentenee is 
eligible for parole after seven years .•• and ..• any [im-
prisonment] short of life is not punishment" for defendant 
"because he is accustomed to being in jail. ••. That is no 
punishment for him. . • • He will go out and do something 
right away again in five months later, six months later, or 
a year later .••. When he eomes out, who knows what resent-
ment he is going to bear and against whom' It can be 
anybody. Maybe it will be one of his family; maybe it will 
be Graeelee; it might be the judge, might be me, might be 
you, you can't tell." 
In People v. Barclay, 40 Ca1.2d 146 [252 P.2d 321], the 
matter of enlightening the jurors on the consequences of the 
penalties which they may impose in the event of a verdict 
of guilty of murder of the first degree was considered. There 
it was said at pages 157-158: "When a defendant is con-
victed of murder in the first degree, the jury determines 
his punishment as well as his guilt. (Pen. Code, § 190; 
People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 246-247 [121 P. 922] ••• ) 
Since the issues of punishment and guilt are determined at 
the same time, there is danger that evidence or instructions 
offered on the former issue may influence the verdict on the 
latter issue. Accordingly, to avoid prejudice to either the 
People or the accused by injection of collateral issues into 
the case, evidence of the good or bad habits and background 
. of the accused is generally held inadmissible ••• and the 
. consideration of the jury is limited to the facts and circum-
[ stances attending the commission of the offense itself. (Cit-
~. in~ allthorities.) For similar reasons of policy the jury is 
inot allowed to weigh the possibility of parole or pardon in 
/ 
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determining the guilt of the defendant, and it is therefore 
error to give an instruction that allows the jury to take into 
consideration the consequences of a recommendation of life 
imprisonment in arriving at that determination. (See People 
v. Letourneau, 34 Cal.2d 478, 494 [211 P.2d 865].) To aid 
the jury in fixing the punishment of the defendant, however, 
the court may instruct the jll17 as to the consequences of the 
di1ferent penalties that may be imposed 80 that an intelligent 
decision may be made. (Citing authorities.)" The instruc-
tion here challenged was expressly concerned with defendant'. 
punishment i/ defendant was first found guilty 0/ murder 0/ 
1M first degree, and in line with the above-noted distinction 
between the two issues, the court properly informed the jury 
as to the possible consequences of the imposition of a senteI\ce 
of either death or life imprisonment. (40 Ca1.2d 158.) 
[3] Defendant'. counsel made no objection to the district 
attorney'. argument relative to the eft:ect of punishment on 
defendant nor was the court requested to· instruct the jury 
to disregard his remarks. (People v. Kirkell, 39 Oal.2d 719, 
726 [249 P.2d 1].) While the district attorney may have 
been overly zealous in his statements, defendant may not 
now complain. This is not a case where the comment was 
of such character that any possible harmful effect would not 
have been obviated by a timely admonition or instruction to 
the jury (People v. PodWYII, 6 Oal.App.2d 71, 76 [44 P.2d 
377]) or where the evidence was closely balanced, presenting 
grave doubt as to defendant's guilt, 80 that the assailed argu-
ment of prosecuting counsel may have contributed materially 
to the verdict (People v. Berryman, 6 Oal.2d 331, 337 [57 
P.2d 136J; see People v. Sampsell, 34 Oa1.2d 757, 764 [214 
P.2d 813]). 
[4a] Defendant next contends that an instruction on 
the killing as perpetrated by means of lying in wait was 
improperly submitted to the jury. He does not claim that 
it misstates the law. (PeopZ6 v. Tutk,ll, 31 Oa1.2d 92, 99 
[187 P.2d 16].) But he takes the position that the facts 
did not warrant such a premise of guilt, and the instruction 
removed from the jll17 the right to consider whether or not 
the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. [5] If 
the killing was committed by lying in wait, it was murder 
of the first degree by force of the statute (Pen. Code, § 189 ; 
People v. Sutk, 41 Oal.2d 483, 492 (261 P.2d 241]), and the 
question of premeditation was not furtl1C'r involved. (People 
T. !l'ttJ1&SU, ""pra, 31 Oal.2d 92, 99 .) [4b] Defendant arpea 
) 
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that the evidence showed only that he was in his wife '. 
parked automobile drinking wine and dozing, and not that 
he was waiting near his wife's house for the purpose of 
taking her unawares. But the jury was not required to 
believe defendant's story. The evidence showed that defend-
ant was armed with a .32 Colt pistol during the four hours 
that he waited near his wife's house; that immediately upon 
departure of the last visitor, defendant entered the house 
and, according to his own admission, fired the gun at the 
bed in which his wife was lying. The elements of waiting, 
watching and concealment were all present as a basis for the 
instruction on lying in wait (PeopZe v. Sutic, supra, p. 492), 
and the jury might wen have based its verdict on that theory 
of the case. 
[6] Defendant next argues that the court improperly 
instructed the jury regarding his interest in his wife's estate 
as the result of her death without leaving a will. He claims 
that the instruction incorrectly stated the law and also oper-
ated to his prejudice in suggesting a possible motive for his 
having killed her. According to the evidence, defendant's 
wife was awarded the family home by the interlocutory decree 
of divorce, which had become final at the time of the trial. 
Such decree was a final adjudication of the issues thereby 
determined (Leupe v. Leupe, 21 Ca1.2d 145, 148 [130 P.2d 
697] ). and the family home thereby became the separate 
property of defendant's wife. But inasmuch as the parties 
remained husband and wife until entry of the final decree, 
defendant was entitled as the surviving spouse to· share in 
his wife's estate (Prob. Code, § 221) unless he was convicted 
! of murdering her (Prob. Code, § 258). These were matters 
for the court's judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875.) 
~: .As a recital of defendant's property interest which continued 
f to exist until defendant's final conviction, the instruction l correctly stated the law and was properly given. (Estate 01 
t Agoure, 165 Cal. 427, 428 [132 P. 587].) 
f ['1] Defendant also attacks the court's instructions on the ~, 
L matter of fixing the penalty. After telling the jury that 
C upon a conviction of murder of first degree, it was within 
{ its discretion to impose either the death penalty or life im-~ prisonment, the court continued: "The discretion which 
t the law invests in you is not an arbitrary one and is to be is; .em. ployed only when you are satisfied that the lighter punish-. ment should be imposed. If rov find the defendant guilt" 
, 
) 
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of first degree murder /J1ld d6 not find e:denuating facts or 
circumstances to lighten the punishment, it ia your duty to 
find a l1erdict of murder in the first degree and /itA: the penalty 
at death." (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that 
such instruction placed on him the burden of showing· exten-
uating facts or circumstances as the basis for the jury's 
imposition of the lighter punishment whereas the statute 
contains no such proviso purporting to eontrolthe jury's 
exercise of discretion in the matter of ftxing the penalty. 
(Pen. Code,§ 190.) This precise question was presented in 
People v. WiZliams, 32 Cal.2d 78, 85·86 [195 P.2d 398], and 
after a review of the earlier cases, it was concluded that such 
instruction has been consistently held .. not erroneous" in-
asmuch as "the discretion conferred upon the jury by section 
190 of the Penal Code should not be arbitrarily exereise~ 
for or against a defendant, but should be in1luenced by the 
evidence in the ease • • • controlled by reason and justice 
under the facts of the particular case." (P. 86.) The deci· 
sion in the Williams case is a complete answer to defendant's 
contention. 
Defendant further contends that certain tape recordings of 
conversations between himseU and a deputy district attorney, 
in the presence of police officers, constituted confessions. and 
were admitted in evidence without any foundation being laid 
concerning the voluntary character thereof, and without there-
after giving defendant's requested instructions concerning the 
necessity that such confessions be voluntary. 
[8] The portion of defendant's argument which is directed 
-to the point that an involuntary confession may not be used 
either for the purpose of proving the crime confessed or for 
the purpose of impeaching the defendant is sustained by 
authority. (People v. Baucko, 8 Cal.App.2d 655, 670 [47 
P.2d 1108] : People v. BatemtJfl, 80 Cal.App. 151, 158 [251 
P. 335] ; see, also, People v. CUfton, 186 Gal. 143, 149 [198 
P. 1065].) [9] But when these tape recordings were of. 
fered in evidence defendant made no objection that a proper 
foundation had not been laid or that the contents thereof 
were made involuntarily; and on this appeal defendant has 
. been unable to support such a claim by any evidence in the 
record. It would appear that a proper objection at the time 
of trial could have been met by the prosecution, for there is 
ample support in the record before us that the confessions 
were volUDtary, and there is no evidence which would justif7 
a eontrar,y 8Ddin .. 
I 
I 
/ 
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Defendant's requested instruction defining an involuntary 
confession and his requestcd instruction on the necessity that 
the confession must be voluntary were properly refused. 
[10] The first instruction dealt with involuntariness induced 
by violence, threats, promised immunity or other inducements 
but, as above indicated, there is no evidence in the record 
which could support a conclusion of such improper conduct. 
[11] Defendant's counsel now asserts that the statements 
in the tape recordings were involuntarily made because they 
were made while defendant was under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. Even if such a condition did exist, it did not 
make the confessions inadmissible. This court has declared 
that intoxication at the time of making confessions does "not 
deprive the confessions of the required spontaneity to make 
them free and voluntary." (People v. Dorman, 28 Cal.2d 846, 
854 [172 P.2d 686].) We conclude that the trial court properly 
refused to give either of the requested instructions here be-
cause no rational conclusion could be drawn from the evidence 
other than that the confessions were free and voluntary. 
[12] Since it appears that the confessions in the tape 
recordings were voluntary, the various aspects thereof could 
have been used for impeachment or as affirmative evidence 
of guilt. (People v. 8outhack, 39 Ca1.2d 578, 585 [248 P.2d 
12].) However, at the time the recordings were offered 
in evidence the district attorney stated: "I am offering 
these portions of the recording which were quoted by me to 
the defendant on the witness stand in cross examination for 
the purposes of impeachment and the remainder of the record-
ing for the sole and limited purpose of showing the nature 
of the defendant's voice, his physical condition as revealed 
by his voice, and his nervous condition, or lack thereof, as 
revealed by the voice on the tape recording." This evidence 
was objected to as Hinadmissible" but solely on the theory 
that "it is not proper to save any portion of the case in 
chief to be introduced at this time." The district attorney 
then stated that he could not have impeached the defendant 
until after he had testified. 
Defendant's objection that the evidence should have been 
" presented in the prosecution's case in chief and not subse-
quently in the guise of impeachment is similar to the objec-
tion made in People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 
527], and in People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 418 
[136 P.2d 626]. [13] While the practice by the prosecution 
'Of withholding such evidence for the purpose of ~ it 
/ 
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212 PEOPLE fl. BYRD [42 C.2d 
later for impeachment was condemned in the cited eases, 
it was recognized that the order of proof rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial conrt. (PeopZe v. Avery, supra, p. 491.) 
[14] Under the circumstances presented here, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the ruling admitting the tape record· 
ings. Furthermore, defendant has failed to show any preju. 
dice resulting from the alleged procedural error. 
[15] Defendant also argues that the court erred in not 
giving the "statutory definition" of first and second degree 
murder, and in not fully defining the term "deliberation." 
The following portion of one of defendant's proposed instruc. 
tions was omitted: "To constitute a deliberate and premedi. 
tated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question 
of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, 
having in mind the consequences, decide to and com.mft the 
unlawful act causing death." Contrary to defendant's asser· 
tion, these words are not part of any statutory dellnition 
although the omitted words would have constituted a proper 
portion of an instruction. (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768. 
778 [228 P.2d 281].) [16] The record shows, however, that 
the instructions given fully and fairly advised the jury con· 
cerning the distinction between first and second degree mur· 
der, and also regarding the meaning of deliberation and 
premeditation. Thus, after giving the statutory de1lnition 
of murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and its classification as murder 
of the first degree if the killing is 4'wlllful, deliberate 
and premeditated" ••• with malice aforethought (Pen. Code, 
§ 189), the court continued: "The word 'deliberate' means 
formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful 
thought and weighing of considerations for and against the 
proposed source of action. The word 'premeditated' means 
thought over beforehand." (PeopZe v. Bon6yculf, 29 Cal.2d 
52, 61 [172 P.2d 698].) The law, however, does not reo 
quire that the thought of killing be pondered over for any 
specified length of time in order for the killing to be con· 
&idered deliberate and premeditated. "The time will vary 
with different individuals and under varying circumstances. 
The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent 
of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision 
may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere uncon· 
sidered and rash impulse, even though it include an intent 
to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will 
fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree." 
(PlOp" v. CGf'7nM, .pro, 36 Cal.2d 168, 118.) "A killing 
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of a human being with malice aforethought, but without de. 
liberation and premeditation and not perpetrated by means 
of lying in wait, is murder of the second degree." (Pen. 
Code, § 189.) In addition, the court gave a full instruction 
on malice and also on manslaughter as distinguished from 
murder. A review of the record shows that the instructions 
given satisfy the requirements of the law as recently stated 
by this court. (People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 901·902 
[256 P.2d 911].) 
Finally, defendant contends that the evidence is insuffi· 
cient to sustain the verdict; that he should have been con· 
victed either of second degree murder or manslaughter, and 
that this court should reduce the degree of the crime pursuant 
to the authority conferred by section 1181, subdivision 6, 
of the Penal Code. In this connection defendant argues that 
• he was a chronic alcoholic; that at the time of the killing 
W he was intoxicated, had been taking sleeping pills, and had 
~ been doing so for a long period of time. He claims that i under these conditions he was not capable of forming an intent 
~ or of premeditation. The jury was fully instructed in the 
r language of the statute (Pen. Code, § 22) on the eftect of 
voluntary intoxication, its bearing on a person's ability to 
\ form an intent, and its relevancy insofar as aitecting the 
degree of the crime. (People v. Griggs, 17 Cal.2d 621, 625 
[110 P.2d 1031].) 
A review of the record shows that there was ample evi· 
.. dence from which the jury could have concluded that the 
murder was perpetrated by lying in wait and that it was 
,. the result of prolonged premeditation and deliberation. 
; [17] Direct evidence of a deliberate and premeditated pur· 
, pose to kill is not required to sustain a conviction of tirst 
,'degree murder. Deliberation and premeditation may be in· 
ferred from proof of such facts and circumstances as will 
. furnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference. 
;(People v. Guldbrandsen, 35 Cal.2d 514, 519 [218 P.2d 977].) 
I • [18] As the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction 
'.of murder of the first degree (Pen. Code, § 189), this court 
~ould not be authorized to reduce the degree of the crime 
'«Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6; People V. Daugherty, supra, 40 
,(Jal.2<l 876, 884) or to reduce the penalty from death to life 
imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 1260; People v. Jackson, 36 Cal. 
2d 281, 288 [223 r.2d 236] ; People v. Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 74, 
77 [230 P.2<l 351]). 
'.; 
) 
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The judgment and the order denying a new trial are 
affirmed.. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The court here instructed the jury that "The law of this 
state provides that every person guilty of murder in the first 
degree shall suiter death or confinement in the state prison 
for life, at the discretion of the jury that finds him guilty. 
If you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree, it will be your duty to determine which of the 
two penalties shall be inflicted, the death penalty or con-
finement in the state prison for life. 
"The discretion which the law invests in you is not an 
arbitrary one and is to be employed only when you a're satis-
fied that the lighter punishment should be imposed. If flOU 
fond th. defendant guilty of first degree m·urder and do not 
find ezfenuating facts Of' circumstanceJ 10 lighten th. f>t/,nish-
.ment, if is flour duty to find a verdict of murder", the first 
degree and liz the penalty at death. There will be handed to 
you for your use appropriate forms of verdict." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The emphasized portion of the instruction should not have 
been given. It has not been, and should not be, the law of· 
this state. Section 190 of the Penal Code provides that 
"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall 
8tl1fer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, ot the 
discretion of the jury t'ving the some; ••• " (Emphasis 
added.) The statute leaves the determination of punishment 
for first degree murder to the discretion of the jury oZone, 
directing only that it be death or life imprisonment. To 
permit the court to inform the jury that before life imprison-
ment may be imposed, there must be extenuating circum-
stances is to permit judicial invasion of the province of the 
jury and constitutes an interference with its exercise of the 
discretion directed by the statute. The statute leaves the 
penalty to the 80le discretion of the jury; a majority of this 
court deprives this defendant of the right to a jury trial on 
the issue of penalty by condoning an instruction which tells 
the jury it may not fix the penalty at life imprisonment 
unless it finds that extenuating circumstances existed. 
In Mr. Justice Schauer's dissent in People v. William" 
32 Cal.2d 78 [195 P.2d 393], a case involving the same 
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erroneous instruction, he traced the origin of the error which 
a majority of this court now sanctions once more. He showed 
that it began with specious reasoning in People v. Welch 
(1874),49 Cal. 174, and that it has, from time to time, been 
followed until the present time. In People v. Bollinge,., 196 
Cal. 191, 209 [237 P. 25], the question was once a~~o d:a. 
cussed and the cases holding the giving of such an in-
struction not to be error once again cited. The court there 
said: "We have, however, gone into the subject in the hope, 
if not the expectation, that the practice of giving such instruc-
tions may be abated, thus giving assurance that the penalty 
reflects the decision of the jury alone and at the same time 
sparing this court the necessity of repeatedly passing on lIuch 
assignments of error. And considering the numerous occa-
sions this court has held that section 190 of the Penal Code 
confers on the jury alone the discretion of determining the 
punishment in cases of guilt of murder in the first degree, 
trial courts, especially where a human life is at stake, should 
not interfere with the discharge of that solemn duty by the 
jury." As Mr. Justice Schauer said (dissent, People v. 
WiUiams, sup,.a, 32 Ca1.2d 78, 96): CCThe denounced practice 
has been continued because this court has tolerated it and 
tke evil instruction will continue in use until this court finally 
~. enforces what it has so often recognized to be the law." In 
i, WinstOtl v. United States, Strather v. United States, Smith 
• 'Y. United State" 172 U.S. 303 [19 S.Ct. 212, 43 L.Ed 456] ; 
, ,4ndres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 [68 8.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 
, 1055], the Supreme Court reversed judgments of conviction 
where a statute similar to ours was concerned and instructions 
invading the province of the jury, as here, were given. "The 
, proper practice for the trial court is to refrain from giving 
. any instructions which might have a tendency in the slightest 
degree to influence or control the discretion of the jury in 
its determination of the proper penalty in a case where the 
'defendant is charged with murder in the first degree. " 
; (People v. Martin, 12 Ca1.2d 466. 470471 [85 P.2d 880].) 
, Prior to and including the Williams case, this court deplored, 
while condoning, the error of the instruction (see People v. 
,Bawden, 90 Cal. 195 [27 P. 204] ; People v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 
476 [126 P. 143] ; People v. Bollinger, supra, 196 Cal. 191; 
People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256 [66 P. 2291; People v. Smith, 
13 Cal.2d 223 (88 P.2d 682] ; People v. Kolez, 23 Ca1.2d 670 
[145 P.2d 580]). In the case at bar, we are told by the 
JDaJority that the question of whether or not the livina of 
/ 
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the instl'liction was prejudicial error is completely answered 
by the decision in the Williams case. 
The instruction under consideration is not always given 
when a defendant is charged with 1lrst degree murder. In 
those cases where it is not given and where the discretion 
conferred by statute (Pen. Code, § 190) is left wholly to 
the jury trying the case, the defendant is given his right 
to a jury trial upon all the issues including that of imposition 
of penalty. In cases where the instruction is given, the de-
fendant is deprived of his right to a jury trial upon the issue 
of imposition of penalty. Is this equal protection under law' 
Is not the rule now, as it has always been, that those in the 
same class shan receive equal protection and equal rights' 
It· appears to me that all defendants accused of murder in 
the first degree are members of the same class. For the pur-
pose of this argument, what occurs at the trial in the matler 
of proof is unimportant. If they are 80 accused and stand 
trial before a jury, then they stand in the same position. 
Suppose that there are two defendants charged with murder 
in the first degree. In one instance, the jury is instructed 
in the language of the statute that the penalty to be imposed 
rests in its discretion; in the other, the jury is charged with 
the instruction here under consideration-that it must give 
the death penalty unless it finds "extenuating facts or cir-
cumstances to lighten the punishment." What are these 
extenuating facts and circumstances t Conduct on the part 
of the deceased or conduct of the defendant' If the matter 
is left to the discretion of the jury as directed by the statute, 
many human frailties might be taken into consideration with 
a view toward achieving justiee. ..An examination of the 
record in the case at bar shows no' instruction given which 
defined "extenuating facts and eircumstances." It appears 
to me that the error of the instruction is compounded by leav-
ing to the jury the problem of determining just what facts 
and eircumstances would be considered extenuating in a legal 
sense. If the language of the statute which leaves the matter 
of penalty to the discretion of the jury alone is not observed, 
have such defendants been aecorded due process of law' 
When a jury has been told that in order to fix the penalty 
at life imprisonment it must find "extenuating facts or cir-
cumstances," can it be said that the defendant has not been 
seriously injured in his right to life' .As was said in Andru 
v. United States, supra, 333 U.S. 740, ceIn death eases doubts 
aueh u thOle presented here should be resolved in favor of 
'\ 
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the accused." The perpetuation of the serious error of this 
instruction has the etfect of resolving aU doubts in favor of 
the state. Apparently now it is to be the court-made law 
of this state that the instruction is not erroneous. Mr. Justice 
Traynor, in his dissent in People v. Kolea, $'Upro, 23 Ca1.2d 
670. 675, said that this court has been unwilling to overrule 
· the cases holding that it was not error to give the instruction 
· in question but has also been unwilling to hold that it was 
· proper to give it. That "It has thus placed itself in the 
· inconsistent positioIl of tolerating the giving of an instruction 
that it condemns. It has sought to overcome this incon-
sistency by admonishing trial courts not to give the instrue-
· tion. There can be no such middle ground. however. If the 
instruction is not erroneous it is quite proper for trial courts 
to give it and an unwarranted interference for this court to 
admonish them not to give it. If the instruction is erroneous 
it should be held to be 80 outright. The dilemma is not 
resolved but perpetuated when this court, in deference to 
precedent. sanctions an incorrect instruction and at the same 
time admonishes the trial eourt to cease giving it. The re-
peated disregard of such admonitions demonstrates that if 
the correct rule is to be applied, this court must join in its 
enforcement and reverse the judgments of trial courts that 
vitiate it. Disregard of admonitions of this court in the 
past has been held to indieate an attempt to in1luenee the 
jury improperly and therefore to constitute ground for re-
wrsal. (People v. Maugh8, 149 Cal. 253, 263 [86 P. 187]; 
. People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [135 P.2d 164] ; see People 
Y. Bya'll, 152 Cal. 364 [92 P. 853].)" 
. It also appears to me that the evidence is insufficient to 
.·.·;mlrt",." the giving of an instruction on lying in wait. Ordi-
, the jury determines the state of mind of the defendant 
the degree of the homicide from all of the circumstances. 
the case. A finding that a murder was by lying in wait. 
"'llOll'evln",, necessitates a verdict of first degree murder and 
/ 
from the trier of fact the further question whether 
. was willful, deliberate. and premeditated. (People v. 
/ 2'A.omcu,41 Cal.2d 470, 478 [261 P.2d 1), concurring opinion; 
v. BeN&ard,28 Ca1.2d 207, 211 [169 P.2d 636}; People 
Murphy. 1 Ca1.2d 37. 41 [32 P.2d 635].) The nature of 
act by which the murder was committed outweighs all 
.lIlthl!r circumstances. The dangers inherent in such a rule 
been forcefully pointed out. (Mort'land. The Law of 
p.oBl1C1<lle. pp. 19'1-198, 206-207.) The Featest danpr • 
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that if the rule is improperly invoked a defendant may be 
found guilty of murder in the Arst degree even though there 
is no evidence of lying in wait and the jury did not reach 
the question of premeditation and deliberation. Although 
there was ample evidence of premeditation and deliberation 
in the present case to support a verdict of 1Irst degree murder 
on that ground, under the instruction on lying in wait the 
jury may have concluded that the crime was perpetrated 
by lying in wait and thus may never have reached the ques-
tion of premeditation and deliberation. Although defendant 
was waiting and watching for his wife's visitor to leave, there 
is no evidence that the shots were fired from a position of 
concealment. Defendant entered his wife's house,· spoke to 
her, and fired the shots that killed her. The victim was 
aware of defendant's presence and no more iA shown than 
that he 4i,d not tell her in advance that he would kill her. 
That circumstance is not enough to require the jury to return 
a verdict of first degree murder. The instruction is preju-
diciously erroneous since it permitted the jury to return a 
verdict of first degree murder without Arst finding premedi-
tation and deliberation. 
For the reasons above stated, I would reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, l., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusions 
and reasoning in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Carter 
except that I do not agree with any implications therein that 
defendant was denied due process of law or equal protection 
of the laws. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Karch 3, 
1954. Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J .. were of the 
opinion that the petitiolL should be aranted. 
